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Abstract 
The revolutions of 1989 have predominantly been understood as the 
confirmation of Western, liberal democracy as the ultimate model of the 
modern polity. Here, it is however argued that there is more to 1989 than the 
mere collapse of the communist world as the direct alternative to Western 
modernity. 1989 has had subtle implications for rethinking democracy. 1989 
should not be understood as merely marking the triumph of Western liberal 
democracy, but instead, it can be shown that the events of 1989 and 
dissident thought also entailed a variety of alternative democratic models, the 
retrieval of which can help reinvigorate (and in many cases has already done 
so) current debates on democracy. In the essay, I will first argue that the 
general interpretation of 1989 as a triumph of liberal democracy is 
problematic. I will then proceed by discussing four alternative understandings 
of democracy that have emerged with 1989, for analytical purposes 
represented as democratic models: radicalized liberal democracy, republican 
democracy, civil democracy, and cosmopolitan democracy. The alternative 
dimensions of democracy as articulated by East-Central European dissidents 
have been sensed, picked up, and re-elaborated in political theory since 
1989, in this contributing to perceptive shifts in the democratic imaginary. 
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Introduction 
The revolutions of 1989 have been predominantly understood as the confirmation of 
Western democracy - in its liberal-democratic guise - as the ultimate model of the modern 
polity. In this essay, it is however argued that there is more to 1989 than the mere collapse 
of the communist world as the direct alternative to Western modernity, and therefore the 
irrefutable triumph of the latter. 1989 has had subtle implications for thinking about 
democracy, providing a basis and an input for shifting perceptions of democracy. 1989 is 
taken here in a wider sense, i.e., as both a moment of the culmination of political ideas on 
democracy as endorsed by East-Central European dissidents throughout the 1980s (which, 
in part, differ in significant ways from the standard Western model of liberal individualist 
democracy), and, in a related way, as involving a distinct set of political practices that 
emerged most clearly in the ‘revolutions’ of 1989 (among others, in the form of the well-
known Round Table negotiations as well as practices of democracy-building in its wake). 
In this essay, it will thus be argued that 1989, as a set of ideas (in particular, dissident 
thought) as well as a set of practices (civic participation and deliberation, negotiation, 
regime change, constitutionalisation), can and has provided important inspirational input 
for the normative political theory of democracy. As such, 1989 should not be understood as 
marking merely the triumph of Western liberal democracy. Instead, the events of 1989 and 
dissident thought clearly engaged with a variety of democratic models, the retrieval of 
which can help reinvigorate (and in many cases has already done so) current debates on 
democracy. The focus here will be on visible reflections in political theory on the ideas and 
practices of 1989, and on the ways in which such ideas and practices have informed 
alternative proposals for democracy. In other words, the essay will pursue a kind of 
hermeneutical revisiting of the theoretical reflections on the historical event and ideas of 
1989 as found in political theory, and the extent to which these have been elaborated in 
alternative ways of imagining democracy.  
In the essay, I will first argue that the general interpretation of 1989 as a triumph of 
liberal democracy is problematic. It will then proceed by discussing four alternative 
understandings of democracy that have emerged with 1989, for analytical purposes 
represented as democratic models: radicalized liberal democracy, republican democracy, 
civil democracy, and cosmopolitan democracy. Each of these models represent different 
foci on democracy, and as such arguments referring to each of them were present in 
dissident thought as well as visible in political action. But perhaps more significant for the 
argument here is that these different foci or dimensions of democracy as articulated by 
East-Central European dissidents have been sensed, picked up, and re-elaborated in 
political theory since 1989, thereby contributing to perceptive shifts in the democratic 
imaginary. 
 
 
1989 and Liberal Democracy 
It seems fairly accurate to argue that the collapse of ‘really existing socialism’ in 1989 has 
been predominantly understood as the affirmation of the conventional perception of 
political modernity as liberal democracy. Indeed, the overall understanding of the political 
transformations in East-Central Europe has been one of ‘banality’ and as primarily about 
‘normalization’ (Outhwaite and Ray 2005; Melegh 2006). 
With regard to the predominant thinking about democracy in the West (understood here 
largely as Western Europe and the United States), in the liberal reading the impact of 1989 
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seems to be of limited import, in that 1989 has principally confirmed the superiority of 
liberal democracy as a political form, and showed the fundamental importance of 
constitutional democracy with its emphasis on rights and the rule of law as an antidote to 
totalitarianism (Garton Ash 1990; Habermas 1990). Rather than as presenting us with a 
profoundly unique situation of democratization in a post-totalitarian context that would 
require a context-specific approach, and, in this, could shed new light on possibilities of 
democracy as such, the events in the East have been greeted as confirmations of the 
liberalism-cum-human–rights prevalence in the West. What is more, the political discourses 
that sustained the Eastern European ‘revolutions’ are for the most part read as 
confirmations of the Western liberal discourse, and as without any innovative content (at 
least not beyond the communist or (post-)totalitarian context), and ultimately expressing the 
wish to repeat Western experiences, or as strongly grounded in Western ideas of liberal 
democracy to begin with (cf. Falk 2003). It might be argued then, that the earlier 
convergence thesis that postulated a rapprochement between East and West is now coming 
true. Not so much as in the emergence of a third way between capitalism and communism, 
but as a major flattening of the political (as well as economic) imaginary of modernity.  
The significance of dissident thought and the alternative ideas on democracy emerging 
from the events of 1989 have, in this, been mostly overlooked, underestimated, or simply 
ignored1 by a quite number of political thinkers, who in general tend to interpret the 1989 
events from a predominantly liberal point of view. As has often been noted, one of the more 
prominent of such interpretations was Jürgen Habermas’s idea of the ‘catch-up revolution‘ 
(nachholende Revolution). A further example of the ultimate negation of potential novelty 
of 1989 for democratic thought can be found in the reflections of Bruce Ackerman. While 
on the face of it, Ackerman, in his reflections on the ‘future of the liberal revolution’, seems 
to appreciate the impact of the events of 1989 more widely than Habermas, his point 
ultimately seems to be that, the 1989 revolutions underline, or reactivate, a liberal 
revolutionary tradition that is firmly grounded in the American constitutional tradition. In 
other words, Ackerman seems to suggest that the 1989 events might help Westerners 
remind them of a successful tradition of their own, indeed the ‘return of revolutionary 
democratic liberalism’ (1992: 1, emphasis added), rather than involve the generation of 
something possibly novel and innovative, and therefore of specific significance for 
renovating modern democracy.  
The understanding of 1989 as either a mere rerun of, or fulfilling of, 1789, in terms of a 
catching-up of East-Central Europe with the achievements of the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution, as in Habermas, or as  a reminder of latent Western traditions, as in 
Ackerman, overlooks possible elements of uniqueness of the event of 1989 and the ideas 
that informed it, as well as its reposing of innate problématiques of political modernity (cf. 
Howard 1995; Wagner 2006). Even if the 1989 revolutions were clearly ‘rights revolutions’ 
(Sadurski and Priban 2006) and had a ‘liberal legalist character’, they cannot be reduced to 
this as they also pointed to the limitations of the rule of law and human rights, and the 
necessity of a rethinking of the liberal democratic project (Priban 2002: 55). 
Relatively few political theorists dealing with the issue of contemporary democracy 
have attempted to challenge the predominant view of 1989 as an affirmation of liberal 
democracy, and argued for a more profound reassessment of democracy – and of political 
                                                 
1 As Isaac argued in the mid-1990s, American political theorists basically ignored the events of 1989 (Isaac 
1995). 
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theory for that matter - in the light of the collapse of Soviet totalitarianism. Possible 
innovative potential of dissident thought and the learning effects regarding the changes and 
political actions of 1989 have in reality significantly inspired innovative Western political 
theory and stimulated a kind of learning effect or lesson.2 Below, at least four – interrelated 
- dimensions will be touched upon, as they can be found in the work of political and legal 
theorists reflecting on the experiences of 1989. These four dimensions pertain to what could 
be seen as four different models of democracy, which should not, however, be taken as 
mutually exclusive nor should the work of single authors be taken to be as exclusively 
situated in any one of these. The four models inspired by dissident thought and 1989 in a 
more general sense are radicalized liberal democracy, republican democracy, civil 
democracy, and cosmopolitan democracy. 
 
 
Radicalized Liberal Democracy 
As becomes clear above, it is too reductive to see 1989 as merely resulting in the 
confirmation of Western traditions of liberal democracy. It seems more fruitful to read the 
revolutions of 1989 as an invitation to critically rethink the foundations of liberal 
democracy as such. One of the implications of 1989 is that it indeed seems to have inspired 
a qualitative change in the conventional liberal theory of democracy in terms of the rise into 
prominence of the concept of civil society.3 The possible significance of 1989 - and the 
developments that led to its occurrence - for rethinking liberal democracy is especially clear 
in this renewed attention to the notion of ‘civil society’ as a mode of reinvigorating elitist-
based liberal politics.  
Here, the work of one prominent political theorist, Andrew Arato, can be taken as one 
important piece of evidence of the inspiration 1989 has provided for rethinking liberal 
democracy. Arato, currently professor of Social and Political Theory at the New School of 
Social Research, has from the early days of dissidence (see, e.g., Arato 1981) been an astute 
observer of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, and much of his work on civil 
society is a direct reflection of Central and Eastern European developments. A good part of 
Arato’s works (1981; 1990; 1992, with Jean Cohen; 1993; 2000) can indeed be read as an 
important re-interpretation of 1989 from the point of view of liberal democracy.  
In what is probably the most significant contribution to the debate on civil society in the 
1990s, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato’s Civil Society and Political Theory, East-Central 
European discourse forms an important source of inspiration for a redefinition of the notion 
of civil society, and for a radicalization of the whole project of liberal democracy. While 
taking into account more or less parallel debates in the West, including in Latin America, 
and in Eastern Europe, Cohen and Arato importantly show that in the case of the Polish 
experience with Solidarity, the self-organization of society was not only about pitting an 
autonomously organized civil society against the repressive state (as is often argued), but 
also, especially through the experience of the roundtable talks, about a learning experience 
of negotiation and compromise, and the partial politicisation of civil society.4 The 
                                                 
2 See, in particular, Cohen & Arato 1992; Keane 1988; Lefort 2007; Mouffe 1993; Rosanvallon 2006; Walzer 
1995. 
3 The renewed focus on civil society has been seen as the ‘second renaissance’ of the concept, see Wagner 
2006. See also Cohen & Arato 1992. 
4 Falk (2003: 308-9) argues that in Hungarian dissident thought, and in Konrad’s work in particular, a more 
inclusive notion of politics, including both civil society and the state, was there all along. 
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experience of dissidence not only (re-)emphasized the importance of autonomous civil 
society as a sphere that is not dominated by political power, as has often been argued (cf. 
Hann & Dunn 1996), but also evidenced the significance of political society in modern 
democracy and its elaboration as a distinct category. 
Thus, for instance, in his widely influential ‘Antipolitics’ Gyorgy Konrad did not just 
argue for a radically non-political anti-politics,5 but also, in a more accurate reading, for the 
democratisation of both civil society and the state: ‘[a]ntipolitics strives to put politics in its 
place and make sure it stays there, never overstepping its proper office of defending and 
refining the rules of the game of civil society’ (Konrad 1984: 92). Konrad perceived the 
role of civil society, and of intellectuals in particular, as one of pushing political society 
into the right direction: ‘[t]he intellectual aristocracy has no desire to bring down 
governments […] [but] is content to push the state administration in the direction of more 
intelligent, more responsible strategies. Its members do this as part of the self-governing 
intellectual community, even though they act individually, independent of the state’ 
(Konrad 1984: 224-5). Also Adam Michnik, in his famous essay ‘A New Evolutionism’, 
acknowledges the importance of a political society and its reform, rather than its negligence 
or destruction: 
 
The Polish example demonstrates that real concessions can be won applying steady public 
pressures on the government. To draw a parallel with events at the other end of our continent, 
one could say that the ideas of the Polish democratic opposition resemble the Spanish rather 
than the Portuguese model. This is based on gradual and piecemeal change, not violent 
upheaval and forceful destruction of the existing system (1985: 142-3). 
 
This insight has importance not merely for totalitarian societies or the newly emerging 
democracies, but clearly also for more established ones. This dualistic understanding of 
politics can be understood as a way of revising and radicalizing liberal democracy by 
putting more emphasis on the civic, participatory side to politics rather than merely the 
representative one. In this regard, political society needs to be understood as distinct from, 
but at the same time open to demands and contributions from, civil society (Cohen & Arato 
1992: 60, 65). In other words, the fear that a turn to civil society might add up to fully 
direct form of democratic politics that undermines liberal democracy, or, in other words, 
that an intractable polarization might result from an over-united, over-mobilized, and ‘anti-
political’ civil society (as feared, for instance, by Linz and Stepan 1996) can be corrected 
by a ‘turn to political society’ (Cohen & Arato 1992: 67). One of the lessons drawn by 
Cohen and Arato is then the insight that a viable democracy (in both East and West) 
ultimately needs to be based on both a democratic political and a civil society, and should 
contain a fragile balance between a pluralised and relatively independent civil society and a 
sufficiently open and relatively autonomous political society (1992: 78-82): 
 
Such ties [between political and civil society] would presuppose a programmatic openness of 
the political to the civil and a sufficient strengthening of the latter to allow it to function in 
institutionalised forms. What is needed, in other words, are programs that not only establish 
an ongoing process of political exchange with organizations and initiatives outside the party 
political sphere but also strengthen civil society with respect to the new economic society in 
                                                 
5 Walzer, among others, seems to understand Konrad’s ‘Antipolitics’ as only about an anti-statist anti-politics 
(1995: 21). 
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formation. Only such a program could offer something genuinely new with respect to the 
present models of Western politics, thereby transcending the bad choice of either economic 
liberalism and elite democracy or direct democratic fundamentalism (1992: 82; emphasis 
added). 
 
In itself, such an interpretation - that emphasizes a reinvigoration of liberal democratic 
politics not only by a turn to civil society, but also by taking into account the importance of 
the role of the state, and to seek to carefully balance the two - is not entirely novel and has 
been equally observed by other political theorists (see Keane 1988; Walzer 1995). In 
general, the risk with this balanced or dualistic view of politics is that it could in itself be 
taken as ultimately a mere confirmation of a liberal democratic imaginary of the modern 
polity (cf. Terrier & Wagner 2006). In other words, the reduction of the participative idea 
of civil society to an informal and informative role involves the danger of collapsing civil 
society into a notion that indicates the mere external support for liberal democratic politics. 
Politics as such is then ultimately situated within the sphere of representative, professional 
politics (Baker 2002). The risk is thus that civil society becomes reduced to a form of dense 
associational life outside of the state without much of a well-developed political voice. In 
this, the reinvigoration of classical liberal democracy by taking recourse to the notion of 
civil society seems to have often resulted (even if unintentionally) in the ‘taming of civil 
society’ (Baker 2002) rather than in the imagination of radically new model of democracy 
that sees civil society as an end in itself. 
And indeed, it has been argued that Arato’s Habermasian understanding of civil society 
ultimately takes a liberal turn by relegating it to the status of one of three sub-systems in 
modern democracy, the others being political society and the economy, and by placing the 
political in the sphere of political rather than civil society. If a supportive role is what is 
finally implied by the idea of a participative civil society, then it can indeed be taken as one 
of the ways of ‘taming’ the more radical notion of civil society as it emerged from the ideas 
of dissidents such as Havel, Konrad, and Michnik (see Baker 2002: 100), and as such as 
abandoning the idea of a significant radicalization of liberal democracy. This loss of 
political momentum is exactly what, according to Baker, the taming of civil society has 
been about:  
 
... the central change to the theory of civil society so understood is that civil society is now 
seen as external to democracy. This is because democracy itself is viewed exclusively as a 
political mechanism for representation in the state such that civil society, while it furthers 
such representation and is therefore indispensable to a democratic polity, is effectively not 
[part] of it’ (Baker 2002: 92).  
 
Thus, Baker argues further that  
 
‘... the liberal democratic vision of civil society appears to have fundamentally influenced 
even those more radical theorists who, though they no longer stand by their earlier models, 
are still concerned with civil society’s radical potentialities. The evolution of Arato’s work is 
instructive here. In his original analysis of the Polish model of civil society in 1981, Arato 
was optimistic about the possibilities for greater self-management in all spheres that the 
strategy of putting ‘civil society first’ held out. He was also convinced of the need for the 
Western liberal democracies to be transformed through an encounter with radical civil 
society. Yet in a 1994 analysis... Arato ends up in a not dissimilar place to [liberal, pb] 
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theorists of democratisation... That is, his focus is now limited to the question of what civil 
society can do for liberal democracy in terms of extending its legitimacy and deepening its 
democratic practices’ (Baker 2002: 99-100).  
 
If the radicalization of liberalism through the emphasis on civil society merely adds up 
to a confirmation of a dualistic understanding of civil and political society in which only 
the latter is involved in ‘real politics’, and this is what is left of a learning experience 
derived from East-Central European dissidence and 1989, then the challenge of the liberal 
model of democracy seems to have in the end been rather marginal (cf. Wagner 2006). 
 
 
Republican Democracy 
The legacy of dissident thought and the events of 1989 can, however, be interpreted in 
ways that are more radically challenging the liberal reading of democracy. One of the most 
convincing lenses of reading 1989 in terms of democratic renewal is through that of 
republicanism. While a liberal element and an ‘ethic of rights’ were without doubt 
prominent in dissident discourse (see for the idea of democratic ethics, Blokker 2008b), and 
while in some sense ‘anti-politics’ could be displayed as a predominantly anti-totalitarian 
strategy rather than as a way of reinvigorating democracy as such, it can also be argued that 
there were important republican aspects present that point to a distinct republican challenge 
of liberal notions of democracy. Such an acknowledgement has clearly wider implications 
for the theory of democracy, as recognized a number of political theorists (cf. Baker 2002; 
Canovan 1998; Falk 2003; Isaac 1992; Lukes 1991; Zolkos 2004). The more significant 
contributions are discussed below. 
In a republican reading, the dissident discourse in East-Central Europe was clearly not 
only about the enforcement of rights, or a limited extension of formal rights of participation 
for civil society, but also endorsed the more radical notions of self-government, autonomy, 
and civic virtue. While the radical liberal model sketched above can be understood as 
proposing a model of formal democracy with more expanded forms of formal civic 
participation, ultimately leaving la politique or formal politics in the sphere of political 
society, in the republican reading politics is enlarged to actually incorporate civil society, 
and in its most radical understandings, republican discourse views authentic politics as 
being only possible in the civic sphere.  
Against the liberal interpretation of representative democracy ultimately being about the 
protection of the individual from a potentially obtrusive state or fellow-citizens, with a 
concomitant strong separation between the political and the civic sphere, in the republican 
model the primary aspect is non-domination through political participation (Zolkos 2004: 
63). Thus, as Magdalena Zolkos argues, Adam Michnik’s proposal of a ‘new evolutionism’ 
and a form of ‘anti-politics’ included not only the idea of a distinct civic sphere, but also a 
‘novel conception of politics’ including a ‘belief in reformation of the individual as a 
necessary condition for social and political renewal’ (Zolkos 2004: 67). Michnik strongly 
emphasised the importance of a political community outside of the state, a ‘parallel polis’, 
that constituted a community with a strong sense of the common good (i.e., non-domination 
and an attachment to the public rather than merely the private good), and a perception of 
politics as a ‘moral imperative’. Also Havel, as underlined by, for instance, Stephen Lukes,  
strongly emphasised the importance of a citizen’s responsibility ‘outside the sphere of their 
own personal well-being’ (1991: 267, fn 5). As Havel argued, ‘[l]iving within the truth, as 
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humanity’s revolt against an enforced position is... an attempt to regain control over one’s 
own sense of responsibility’ (1992: 153) and ‘[t]he point where living within the truth 
ceases to be a mere negation of living with a lie and becomes articulate in a particular way 
is the point at which something is born that might be called the “independent spiritual, 
social, and political life of society” (1992: 176). The increased self-reflexivity and sense of 
society leads to a form of responsibility that is not just ‘the expression of an introverted, 
self-contained responsibility that individuals have to and for themselves alone, but 
responsibility to and for the world’ (1992: 194). 
This public, republican dimension of dissident thought is equally picked up by Jeffrey 
Isaac, who in his book Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion sees the dissidents working 
in the line of the republican ideas of Arendt and Camus, and speaks about the ‘new model 
of behavior’ of the East-Central European dissidents, based on a form of moral resistance to 
oppression and the autonomous political praxis of civil society (Isaac 1992: 248, 251). In 
discussing the possibility of Arendtian, republican politics in practice, Isaac identifies one 
of its instances in the dissident movements of Central and Eastern Europe. Discussing 
Charter 77, he argues: 
 
[T]he Czech democrats viewed politics in nonstrategic, though not antistrategic, terms. While 
they always sought particular objectives – indeed, in their revulsion against grandiose 
ideologies they turned particularity into virtue – they had little aspiration to influence public 
policy directly. For them politics was primarily a way of being and acting so as palpably to 
experience one’s power and affirm one’s dignity... (Isaac 1998: 115). 
 
The emphasis is here clearly on civic virtue and civic autonomy, and much less, as in 
radicalized liberal democracy, on civil society as a partner of political society. Also Gideon 
Baker picks up on the republican thread in dissident thought, and characterizes as its main 
features: first, ‘a concern with the preservation of private autonomy for the sake of a larger 
sphere of freedom in those public spaces in which individuals come together non–
instrumentally...; [s]econd, republican civil society requires active citizenship, but not in the 
sense of explicit calls for high levels of participation, but in the more existential terms of 
calling individuals out of the desert of depoliticised mass society to pursue self-rule...; 
[t]hird, republic civil society looks away from the modern state as the focus of political 
action and towards a more decentralised model of self-government...’ (2002: 154-5). 
 
 
Civil Democracy: Dissidence as Democratic Politics 
If the republican dimension of Eastern European dissidence and the events of 1989 points 
us to the insufficiency of liberal democracy for civic legitimation, and the indispensable 
nature of civic virtue and civic engagement with politics for a durable legitimation of 
democratic politics, it can be argued that dissident thought reveals an additional dimension 
that puts an even more critical attitude to liberal democracy in clear relief and points to the 
invigorating effects of political action on the margins of instituted democratic society. Civic 
disobedience operates at the outer edges of existing society and thereby radicalizes 
republican notions of democracy. The radicality of this dimension consists indeed in its 
endorsement of a form of civic political action that is always on the borderline of what is 
legal, permissible, as well as imaginable. The importance of this dimension - that emerged 
with some of the expressions of dissidence thought and clearly as a fundamental aspect of 
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the action of dissidence itself - is its potential translation into a language of a more general 
relevance for democratic regimes, in other words, into a language of democratic dissent. In 
my view, it is this particular thread in dissident thought that is the most original one and 
that has most potential for an effectively alternative imagination of democratic politics. 
This radical dimension of dissent has indeed be sensed by a number of observers. Rather 
than endorsing any thesis of the incompatibility of dissidence with ‘normal’ democracy, 
i.e., by pointing out the superfluous, compromised and even anti-democratic nature of 
dissidence in the post-1989 era, theorists such Arato (whose work can clearly not be 
reduced to a radical liberal reading), Isaac, and Priban argue for the importance of the 
continuation of a ‘politics of civil disobedience’, ‘rebellious politics’ or an ‘ethic of dissent’ 
in the enduring democratization of any democracy. The experience of dissidence in East-
Central Europe not only provides us with a confirmation of the importance of a legal 
language of human rights and the rule of law as antidotes against forms of repression and 
totalitarianism and as a primary means to cut out a space of civil interaction. Rather, as 
Arato and Priban show most clearly, the legality of the constitutional state is not sufficient 
for the establishment of democracy. The latter needs extensive public participation, the 
communication between legality and discourses of extra-legal legitimation emerging from 
civil society, and in particular continuous public scrutiny and dissent in order to be able to 
function as a legitimate democratic regime. Both Arato and Priban point to an approach that 
attempts to enshrine a revolutionary spirit in modern democratic regimes and recognises the 
significance of dissenting voices (even if illegal dissent itself can obviously never be 
institutionalized, see Cohen & Arato 1992: 587), offering in my reading a possibility for a 
radical alternative to liberal democracy, which could be labelled ‘civil democracy’ (cf. 
Rosanvallon 2006). 
The most important dimension of democratizing democracy consists of those civic 
strategies that do not merely confirm legality and the constitutional status quo, but that seek 
to deepen democracy from a peripheral position. It is in particular through such acts of civil 
disobedience - which Cohen and Arato label ‘examples of self-limiting radicalism per 
excellence’ (1992: 567) - that civil society transcends a defensive strategy of correcting 
democracy and can play an offensive and creative role in the democratization of 
democracy. Thus, in order to fully realize its emancipatory potential, the project of 
democratizing democracy needs to go beyond an exclusive focus on the defence of existing 
rights by means of civic politics (Cohen & Arato 1988: 56), and needs to tap into sources of 
civic creativity that scrutinize the outer limits of predominant understandings of politics and 
potentially elaborate novel discourses of democratic legitimation.  
Here, Priban’s work sheds important light on what he calls ‘the ‘strategy of dissent’, 
which he derives directly from the East-Central European dissident experience. In Priban’s 
view, democracy cannot consist merely of a procedural-legal structure, as ‘[h]umanity 
reduced to human rights and freedoms, that is, humanity as a category of the system of 
positive law, is a parody of the human condition’ (2002: 173). Legality in liberal 
democracies seeks to portray itself as the exclusive legitimation strategy, as a sovereign and 
universal language of democratic rights, and tends in this regard to discursive closure and 
to contradict ‘ideas of democracy, freedom and political plurality’ (2002: 150). The anti-
foundationalist spirit of East-Central European dissidence becomes important here in that it 
points to a plurality of democratic discourses and the multi-interpretability of rights and 
freedoms, the impossibility of fully institutionalizing democracy once and for all, and the 
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continuous ‘challenge of any systemic language claiming sovereignty’ (2002: 170) in order 
to prevent disenchantment with democracy.  
The role of civil society is crucial in its cultivation of alternative voices and of dissent as 
an ‘ironical struggle against systemic formalism’ and pointing out of ‘possible alternatives 
to existing legal normativity’ (2002: 162). Acts of dissidence play a critical role in 
reinvigorating a second dimension of constitutional democracy, that is, beyond a 
universally understood legal order institutionalizing individual rights, democracy is also 
always about emancipation and civic autonomy or self-rule (cf. Castoriadis 1997; Canovan 
1999; Meny and Surel 2000). As also Cohen and Arato (1992: 587) argue, ‘[d]isobedience 
in the defense of individual rights does follow from the idea of fundamental rights, but civil 
disobedience proper, especially if it involves the creation of new rights, follows from the 
second normative underpinning of constitutional democracies, the other basis of 
constitutionalism forgotten by the liberal, namely, the idea of democratic legitimacy’. In 
Priban’s view, the ‘dissident strategy of legal legitimation goes beyond legalist discourse 
and is entrenched in a moral and existential vocabulary which does not perceive morality as 
some sphere of rules, prescriptions and governance, but as that sphere which opens up the 
possibility to experience human authenticity and independence’ (2002: 169). 
In this, Priban suggests the broader significance of a dissident ethic or, to put it 
differently, ‘a need for a radical version of liberalism’ (Priban 2002: 55), beyond the 
immediate context of the anti-totalitarian struggle. In his view, ‘the experience of anti-
communist dissent may be generalised to apply to all to modern societies (for communist 
totalitarianism is a product of modernity as is liberal democracy) as a challenge of any 
systemic language claiming sovereignty’ (Priban 2002: 170). He further argues: 
  
The strategy of dissidence is applicable to the liberal democratic conditions of the rule of law 
because legality seeks to declare itself the sovereign legitimation framework there as well 
although this is done with the help of the moral vocabulary of human rights and democracy. 
Dissent is not only a political position and action. It is first of all an expression of the social 
requirement of understanding and comprehending every structure and normative system in 
order to make them legitimate.  
 
East-Central European dissidence was, in his opinion, not only about the claim that the 
rights stipulated in the communist constitutions should be actually observed in political 
reality (legalism), but also entailed the insight that the observance of the law could only be 
the starting point, the necessary but not sufficient condition, for people to be able to ‘live in 
truth’, to lead authentic lives. Priban thus returns to Havel’s insistence of ‘living in truth’ 
and authenticity, and argues therefore that ’dissent is indispensable to all modern 
democratic regimes’ in that it does not allow for any legitimating discourse to claim full 
sovereignty (2002: 170). Crucial is his insistence on the critical role of civil society, which 
does not merely consist of a denunciation of dysfunctional elements and a call for the strict 
application of the law, i.e., the defensive approach mentioned earlier. Rather, Priban’s 
‘ethic of dissent’ reveals the insufficient nature of liberal-democratic law (2002: 171) and 
suggests a mode of ‘permanent communication between the legal system and its 
environment’ instead. Such a communication prevents legal language from turning into a 
langue de bois or what Priban calls ptydepe (following Havel), an atrophied language 
incomprehensible for the rest of society. What is more, such a continuous dialogue between 
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centre and periphery culturally embeds legal language into the discursive structures and 
political cultures of civil society itself. 
The ‘ethic of dissent’ understood as an intrinsic part of democracy offers a way of 
challenging the democratic system without fundamentally destroying it, being in this 
faithful to the idea of ‘radical self-limitation’. Crucial is the insistence on ‘the limited 
validity of every social system without attributing universal validity and binding force to 
itself. Dissent as a legitimation strategy means the end of all attempts at a universal 
legitimation’ (Priban 2002: 172). The role of civil society is to challenge the dominant logic 
of an ‘ethic of rights’, and to articulate alternative ways of justifying the democratic regime 
in a pursuit of an ‘ethic of dissent’. The fundamental purpose of this ethic of dissent is to 
show that democracy is never entirely reducible to a singular justification of proceduralism 
and legalism, but, in order to enjoy legitimacy rather than just legality, needs social 
comprehension and continuous reformulation by civil society. In this, the experience of 
dissidence and the ‘double language’ of the various dissidents and dissident groupings 
show not only an appreciation of legality, the rule of law, and the indispensable nature of 
the protection of human rights (as argued by those that see 1989 as mostly or even 
exclusively a moment of ‘rights revolutions’), but also a sensibility for the fact that the rule 
of law can never be sufficient, and cannot stand on itself. Modern democracy cannot be 
reduced to the rule of law, and legal systems need a continuous correction by ‘dissenting’ 
citizens in order to prevent the rule of law from becoming a herbarium of ‘ice flowers’ 
(Priban 2002: 143).  
 
 
Cosmopolitan Democracy 
The idea of a ‘civil democracy’ grounded in an ethic of dissent can arguably be seen as the 
most important and radical idea that has emerged from the experiences of 1989. As duly 
recognized by the dissidents themselves, such a radical understanding of a form of 
democracy grounded in the idea of ‘radical self-limitation’ and a critical attitude would, 
however, be rather ineffective if thought to be confined to the boundaries of the modern 
nation-state. In various ways, modern democracies are part of, and subject to, phenomena 
that transcend the confines of a formally distinct, national democratic regime. In terms of 
rights, a foundational aspect of any democracy, it can be argued that there is an increasingly 
dominant global political culture of human rights as well as of constitutionalism. And what 
is more, it is clear that the formal adherence of governments to rights catalogues enshrined 
in national constitutions is not sufficient to safeguard such rights. Regarding cultural and 
collective identity, democratic regimes are increasingly exposed to cultural diversity and 
minorities as a result of migration. And in the European context, there is clearly a 
significant influence of the process of European integration on national democratic regimes.  
It can be argued that there was a certain sensibility for a dimension beyond the 
Westphalian nation-state in the dissident ideas of the 1980s, and a clear understanding that 
democracy could not be confined to the classical, liberal and representative form of 
democracy, but would need to be based on some kind of cosmopolitan understanding. 
Forms of civic debate would contribute to the construction of a new, civic culture beyond 
the narrow political communities of the nation-state and action on the transnational level 
would confront national governments with demands for further democratization and the 
application of rights. The significance of this dimension can be found in its diffusion of an 
democratic dialogue and an ‘ethic of dissent’ on a transnational level. This cosmopolitan 
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dimension has been recognized and picked up by a number of theorists, who have 
interpreted 1989 as part of a more qualitative change of modern democracy (cf. Falk 2003: 
352-3). In other words, the event of 1989 and its aftermath bring in relief more sharply 
today’s disentanglement of the state, nation, and society, or, in the words of Ulf Hedetoft, 
the dissolution of the triangular relation between politics, identity and culture (Hedetoft 
1999). On the basis of this insight, such theorists argue that democracy cannot be confined 
anymore to the self-determination of a distinct people in the closed context of the nation-
state, but needs to transcend national boundaries by means of the construction of an 
‘international civil society’ or ‘European civil society’ and the awareness of a transnational 
dimension of rights. 
The relation between a disappearing bipolar world and the emergence of a transnational 
public sphere has been perceived most clearly by Mary Kaldor in her work on, and 
involvement in, ‘global civil society’ (e.g., Kaldor 1991; 2003). The emergence of a 
transnational dialogue and forms of civic interaction in the 1980s had a dual origin in 
political action, in that these derived from the experience of new social movements in the 
West and dissident groups in the East, and their interaction in a ‘European East-West 
dialogue’ during the 1980s. There was, however, also an important normative and 
discursive dimension in that such transnational forms of interaction were grounded in the 
more theoretical elaboration of notions such as ‘European civil society’, an ‘international 
public sphere’, a ‘world forum’, and a ‘parallel cosmopolis’ (Kaldor 2003). It can be argued 
that dissident thinking proposed ‘new definitions of European civil society that are still 
being worked today’ and that the ruptures of 1989 facilitated the possibility of a 
transnational civil society as well as the emergence of a cosmopolitan understanding of 
European citizenship (Stevenson 2005: 46-7). In this, Jeffrey Isaac has hinted at, although 
not explicitly recognized, an affinity between the transnationalism of dissidents and 
Arendtian forms of civic action and associational politics beyond borders (Isaac 1998). 
What is significant in this is that dissidents recognized the anachronism and limitations of 
democratic politics confined to the national level and the importance of civic action not 
only within nationally confined public spheres and political communities, but increasingly 
also on a cross-national and transnational level, diffusing in this a new democratic political 
culture. 
A clear example of ideas on transnational civil society in dissident thought is Konrad’s 
argument for a cosmopolitan global culture in Antipolitics. He argues that a ‘global culture 
with its own institutions is growing up today’ and that ‘[w]e may describe as transnational 
those intellectuals who are at home in the cultures of other peoples as well as their own’, 
while the ‘nation is a transitional state of integration; in the nineteenth century it was wide 
and spacious, but today it is narrow’ (1984: 209, 10).6 Similarly, in Vaclav Havel’s work 
one can find a dimension of cosmopolitanism in his ideas of dissidence as including an 
‘interest in all those who do not speak up’ (Havel 1992: 170) and ‘living in truth’ as about a 
‘concern for others’ (1992: 195), while ‘living in truth’ cannot in fact mean an ‘introverted, 
self contained responsibility’, a care merely for self-interest, but ‘responsibility to and for 
the world’ (1992: 194; cf. Findlay 1999). 
Such cosmopolitan features were particularly evident in (some dimensions of) the 
cultural idea of Central Europe as invoked by Konrad and Havel (Blokker 2008; Delanty 
                                                 
6 Konrad’s view of a global culture particularly endorsed by intellectuals has, for instance, been picked up by 
Ulf Hannerz (1990) in his famous essay ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture’. 
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1996; Delanty and Vidmar-Horvat 2008). This understanding of civil society in a 
transnational, pan-European sense emerged in relation to a cultural, multi- and trans-
national understanding of Central Europe that appeared in the 1980s as a form of counter-
identity of East-Central Europe to Soviet domination, but also as an inspiring myth as how 
to construct an alternative to the heteronomous societies in the Soviet empire. The emphasis 
in the idea of Central Europe was on overcoming the limitations of essentialistic, 
nationalistic ideas, the recognition of cultural diversity, and intercultural dialogue across 
borders. Havel’s ‘living in truth’ can indeed only be imagined in a public sphere extends 
beyond an individual’s immediate societal context, and includes an awareness of humanity 
beyond his/her national community. While clearly not all narratives of Central Europe can 
be understood as inclusive, diversity-sensitive, and transnational (see Blokker 2008; 
Delanty 1996) – some of them are indeed mutually exclusive - the distinct ‘emancipatory’ 
dimension of the Central European myth did contain a critical attitude towards both 
capitalist, mass-consuming Western and communist Eastern Europe. 
In this, ‘Central Europe as a task’ (Konrad 1986: 87) points to a ‘cosmopolitan’ mindset 
that is reflexive of both the self and the other, and endorses a European identity on the basis 
of dialogue and mutual recognition. In this sense, it can be argued that Central Europe as an 
emancipatory notion had relevance not only for communist Europe, but also as a ‘post-
modern European identity encompassing the whole of the European continent’, proposing a 
form of anti-totalitarian identity for post-1989 Europe that rejects singular truths and 
includes a ‘new pluralism’ (Betz 1990: 183ff). The emancipatory narrative of Central 
Europe, with its notions of multi-cultural co-habitation, autonomy, the decentralization of 
power, horizontal interaction and dialogue, and the self-conscious engagement with cultural 
diversity as key dimensions of democratic societies, can have immediate significance in the 
context of European political integration (Blokker 2008). In this regard, it is significant that 
someone like Adam Michnik still relates to himself as a ‘cosmo-Pole’ or a cosmopolite of a 
‘Central and Eastern European variety’, one that accepts the importance of both 
Europeanness and national originality (Michnik 2003: 62). In such forms of embedded 
cosmopolitan ideas of identity, the Central European idea comes full circle with the anti-
politics of civil society, in that Central Europe is understood as the historical birth-ground 
of civil society and civil practices (Delanty 1996: 100-1). This is also what lends the notion 
a critical edge within the post-1989 European context by combining an anti-totalitarian, an 
anti-nationalist, and an anti-materialist critique.  
 
 
Conclusions: 1989, Models of Democracy, and the Future of Democracy 
The predominant trend in the theorization of democracy has clearly understood 1989 as a 
reconfirmation of the salience and viability of liberal democracy. However, the event – 
both as a culmination of normative ideas and as a set of political practices – should be taken 
to mean more than that. As discussed in this paper, the radical democratic dimension of 
1989 has indeed been taken up by a number of theorists and has involved different ways of 
imagining such a radical view of democracy. 
I have argued in the paper that one can distinguish at least four models of democracy 
that were invoked in dissident thought and that have in the post-1989 era been further 
elaborated upon by political theorists, in this way contributing to a shift – even if relatively 
marginal so far - in imaginaries of modern democracy. This is not to say that the work of 
those theorists can be confined to any of such analytical models (Arato is a case in point in 
 13
 
 
that he seems to invoke most, if not all, of the models elaborated here in various parts of his 
works). The brief reconstruction of these democratic models clearly shows that first of all, 
dissidents went in their ideas and actions much further than the mere invocation of a liberal 
democratic idea grounded in an ethic of rights against the oppression of totalitarianism. 
Second, it shows that important aspects of radical thinking about democracy have been 
taken up, reflected upon, and further elaborated by political theorists in an attempt to 
reconceptualise our understanding of modern democracy. 
1989 has in this clearly inspired different, alternative ways of imagining democracy. The 
analytical challenges that must remain open for now are attempts to assess to what extent 
such inspiration has indeed visibly strengthened alternative visions of democracy (also 
beyond theoretical elaborations in institutional and policy forms), has had a wider influence 
on, for instance, the theorization of agonistic, participatory, and deliberative understandings 
of democracy, how older visions of industrial and participatory democracy relate to current 
understandings of radical democracy, and how the changes in the East have stimulated the 
democratic imagination beyond the nation-state, as in notions of European civil society and 
democracy. 
 
 
 
Note 
Paul Blokker acknowledges an EU Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship at the 
University of Sussex. 
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